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BOOK REVIEW
PROPERTY, COMPENSATION AND RISK
Property Rights and Compensation: Compulsory Acquisition and
Other Losses. By Jack L. Knetsch. Published in the Studies in Law
and Economics series. Toronto: Butterworths. 1983.
Reviewed by John P. Palmer*
Traditionally, nearly all economic analysis of law has used as a
starting point a concept which has come to be known as "the Coase
Theorem."" The importance of the theorem's conclusions and assumptions becomes very clear as one works through the arguments in Jack
Knetsch's penetrating study, PropertyRights and Compensation:Compulsory Acquisition and Other Losses. The other key concept in economic analysis of law is the determination of which party or parties in
society can bear certain risks at the lowest cost. While Knetsch does a
very good job at applying the Coase theorem to problems of eminent
domain, his analysis of risk and efficient risk-bearing is less satisfactory. This discussion of Knetsch's work begins with a review of the
Coase theorem and its extensions, and then follows through with a discussion of the costs of risks. A concluding section treats the purported
dilemma of trading off equity for efficiency.
Although Coase does not formally state his theorem in his classic
article, restatements abound in other literature.2 Before providing one
of these restatements, let me first indicate that the importance of the
Coase theorem lies not so much in its conclusion as in the analysis of
what happens if its assumptions are not satisfied.
According to the Coase theorem: (1) if transactions costs (broadly
defined) are negligible, (2) if markets are reasonably competitive, (3) if
wealth effects are negligible, and (4) if property rights are well-defined,
then resources will be allocated efficiently regardless of who owns the
property rights.
© John P. Palmer
* Associate Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Economic Analysis of
Property Rights, The University of Western Ontario.
1 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960), 3 J. Law & Econ.1
* See e.g. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed., 1977); Polinsky, An Introduction to
Law and Economics (1983); and many of the journals which now deal exclusively with law and
economics, such as The Journal of Law and Economics, The Journal of Legal Studies, or Research in Law and Economics.
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To those unversed in the economic analysis of law, this theorem
may seem either obfuscated in economic jargon or trivial. Both perceptions are correct. Loosely interpreted, it says that if people can be made
better off by making a deal with each other they will probably do so.
This result is not at all surprising, and in fact forms the basis of most
economic theory.3 The interesting and policy-relevant aspect of the theorem comes to light when we ask, 'under what conditions might other4
wise mutually beneficial deals not be made?'
The simplest answer to this question is 'whenever the assumptions
of the Coase theorem are violated.' In particular, if the costs of making
the deal outweigh the expected gains (that is if transactions costs are
high), if entitlements are poorly defined, or if markets are seriously
non-competitive, then some potentially beneficial deals will not be
made.5 Knetsch's discussion of the Coase theorem and the importance
of its assumptions is superb, especially in Chapter 9 of his treatise."
Extensions and applications of the results of and exceptions to the
Coase theorem are now abundant. 7 Two of the earliest (and hence classic) developments were by Demsetz 8 and Calabresi and Melamed.
Both articles extend the analysis of Coase by examining the more realistic situations in which transactions costs might seriously impede market transactions. Their analyses particularly emphasize the role of
transactions costs in the development of different types of entitlements.
Specifically, Calabresi and Melamed show that on efficiency grounds
property rules are preferable if transactions costs are very high. Again,
Knetsch makes effective use of examples and cases to illustrate these
developments. A problem with Knetsch's treatment of this material is
that his discussion of different types of costs is quite uneven. He elaboa The careful reader will recognize that the Coase theorem is really not much different from
the notions which motivated Adam Smith in his "invisible hand" pronouncements about the efficiency of laissez faire.
4 The analysis of the conditions under which free-markets do not perform efficiently is probably best laid out in Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure (1958), 72 Q. J. Econ. 351.
6 The assumptions concerning wealth effects are of less interest for the ensuing discussion.
They deal instead with which of many different possible efficient allocations would be the resultant
one.
* One major exception to this praise of Knetsch's restatement is that, contrary to Coase,
Knetsch has no qualms about attributing causation when social costs exist. Coase, in his discussion
of Bryant v. Lefever [1878-1879] 4 C.P.D. 172, makes clear that it takes more than one economic
agent to have the existence of a social cost. Attributing causation to one or the other is rarely
more than a red herring since the important question is, 'who has the entitlement to do what?'

Supra, note 2.

* Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter? (1972), 1 . Legal Stud.13
Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral (1972), 1 Har'. L. Rev. 1089.
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rates with abundant clarity on the problems of strategic bargaining as
a cost which impedes transactions. Unfortunately he pays considerably
less attention to the measurement, administrative, and social costs of
different incentive effects of alternative entitlement schemes. This underemphasis is created by, or possibly results from a bias in the author,
which leads him both to underestimate the net benefits of most current
compensation schemes and to overestimate the net benefits of the alternative schemes which he proposes.
A central theme of Knetsch's study is that by relying on market
values, compensation schemes systematically undervalue the amount of
compensation which should be paid to people who suffer losses. The
counter-theme of this review is that the current schemes are generally
better than any feasible alternative.
In Chapters Two through Five, Knetsch develops his theme. The
major aspect of this theme is that people usually value their possessions
at more than the fair market value. If a shirt sells for $25.00, only for
a person undecided about buying that shirt is it worth only $25.00;
others who buy shirts would presumably be willing to pay more than
$25.00, although how much more is difficult if not impossible to determine. The difference between what a shirt is worth to me, that is, the
most I would be willing to pay for it, and what it is worth on the market is what economists call consumer's surplus. Economists specifically,
and policy makers generally, recognize that consumer's surplus is something of value to society and often devote considerable time and effort
to estimating the expected changes in consumer's surplus resulting
from policy changes when doing cost-benefit analyses.
Under most circumstances, the amount of consumer's surplus I receive from any given shirt is quite small; I would not be willing to pay
much more for a specific shirt because there are so many other shirts
available to choose from at the market price. If you 'cause' the loss of
one of my shirts through perhaps negligence, contract breach, eminent
domain, or theft, then you can probably compensate my loss fully by
paying me the market price of the shirt. Either you or I, if you give me
the money and pay for my shopping time and expenses, can replace
that loss by paying the market price for a nearly identical shirt. I will
then be just as well off as I was before the loss. 10 My lost consumer's
surplus in this situation would be negligible because there are so many
other shirts available on the market.
An important exception to this proposition might occur if the shirt
10It is important to emphasize that all transactions costs must also be compensated for if this
argument is to be correct.
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is unique, so that market replacement is difficult, costly, or impossible.
In these situation, using market values to estimate my loss would be
imperfect at best and probably too low. Examples might include:
1. The shirt was the one worn by a Prime Minister at his wedding
and hence cannot be replaced on the market. Just trying to determine
the market value of the single item would be quite costly.
2. The shirt was a gift to me from a special friend or relative. Even
though there are thousands like it on the market, the sentimental value
of the particular shirt given to me cannot be replaced simply by giving
me a similar shirt.
3. The shirt is no longer being produced so I cannot replace it, but
it yielded a great deal of consumer's surplus to me.
In each of these similar cases, the combination of the unique item
and my consumer's surplus means that compensating me for my loss at
market value (even if that were possible without cost) would probably
not fully compensate me. This lost consumer's surplus, or idiosyncratic
value,"' is a real cost to society. As Knetsch points out, ignoring this
cost in policy-making will lead to distorted resource allocation.
Knetsch often ignores or slides over too glibly, the important question of "distorted resource allocation relative to what standard." Often
he refers to distortions relative to an idealized norm of perfect competition with full and costless information. The comparison of different policies against this pollyanna idealization is a fallacy which Demsetz has
called the "nirvana fallacy."' 2 In policy analysis, it is extremely important to compare feasible alternatives; it is not enough simply .to point
out that a particular policy creates a distortion relative to some impossible goal and to argue that it should therefore be changed. The cure
may be worse than the disease.
In defence of Knetsch, he does not completely fall into the trap of
dreaming impossible dreams. Instead, he more subtly and with little or
no empirical support assumes away many of the costs of schemes which
appeal to him and perhaps exaggerates the costs of schemes which do
not. Not surprisingly, the result is that the schemes which Knetsch
favours end up looking very good in comparison with the status quo,
when in fact they involve other costs or distortions which he has not
discussed very thoroughly. His assertions may be correct, but my own
11 This is the term used by Goetz and Scott to describe the same concept in Liquidated
Damages,Penaltiesand the Just Compensation Principle:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory of Efficient Breach (1977), 77 Colum. L. Rev. 544.
12 "In practice, those who adopt the nirvana approach seek to discover discrepancies between
the ideal and the real and if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient."
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint (1969), 12 J.Law & Econ. 1.
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ad hockery coupled with his uncharacteristic lack of empirical evidence
leave me unconvinced that his recommendations are better than most
current compensation schemes.
EVERYTHING IS OPTIMAL
A corollary extension to the analysis of the Coase theorem is that
current policies are optimal. For this corollary to be useful all costs
must be taken into consideration, including the costs of lobbying and
forming new voter coalitions to change current policies, adjustment and
transition costs, and transaction and negotiation costs. Tautologically,
if the current policies were not optimal they would have been changed;
the fact that they have not been changed strongly suggests that the
costs of changing (when fully considered) are greater than the expected
benefits. More precisely, a dynamic version of this argument holds that
because there are costs of changing from one policy to another too rapidly, there is an optimal speed of adjustment. By analogous reasoning,
we must be on the optimal adjustment path, for if the one we are on
were not optimal, considering all costs, we would not be on it.13
Whether one finds this corollary and its dynamic extension appealing or not, it provides a valuable starting point for analyzing proposed
policy changes, including those recommended by Knetsch. For example, in breach of contract cases, Goetz and Scott note that rarely, if
ever, are damages awarded for lost idiosyncratic value, consumer's surplus. While acknowledging that such awards may be problematic, they
suggest that allowing penalty clauses may help to alleviate this loss.
Despite their recommendation and the fact that consumer's surplus is
indeed lost at times due to contract breach, the proposal that penalty
clauses be used to help the contracting parties insure themselves
against this loss (or pay others to help bear the risk) has not typically
been accepted. One possible reason for this particular evolution of publie policy is that the sanctification of penalty clauses would create a
positive and socially detrimental incentive for people to attempt to frustrate the carrying out of contractual obligations. Another possibility
might involve societal proscriptions against certain types of gambling,
which might be encouraged if penalty clauses were permitted. It is at
least plausible that these costs (plus the costs of adjustment were a
change to be made) more than offset the possible benefits of implementing penalty clauses to compensate for lost consumer's surplus.
13 This more dynamic version of the corollary is at least hinted at in a mimeo by James
Buchanan, The Irrelevance of Transactions Costs, Public Choice Center, George Mason University, 1983.
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The risk that I might suffer a loss of consumer's surplus due to
someone else's breach of contract is a risk which I must bear. I cannot
use penalty clauses to induce my contracting partner to accept the risk;
nor can I purchase insurance against such risk in the marketplace, as it
would be extremely costly for an insurer to identify and assess the risk.
Also there are fairly obvious problems associated with any attempts to
measure the amount of my loss, should the breach materialize. Furthermore, if I can buy some insurance against the risk of loss of some
elusive consumer's surplus, I may have an incentive to purchase large
amounts of the insurance and then devote considerable resources to
frustrating the performance of the contract. This problem is commonly
referred to as that of moral hazard.
To continue the example of contract breach, we always face a risk
of lost consumer's surplus due to the breach. This risk is undesirable,
and society would be better off if such risks could be reduced or removed without cost. The problem is that it is costly to reduce these
risks, and virtually impossible (that is, of nearly infinite cost) to remove
them. Consequently, someone must bear them. Generally, if someone
can bear risks more efficiently or at a lower cost than others, that person gets paid to do so through the insurance markets. That such insurance markets have not evolved for lost consumer's surplus suggests that
the person receiving the consumer's surplus is in all likelihood the leastcost bearer of this risk.
Consider, now, a different example. Suppose a person has purchased a house for $100,000 even though she would have been willing
to pay up to $125,000 for the house. 14 By paying only the market price
for the house, she received $25,000 in consumer's surplus. If the house
were to be destroyed by fire, she would lose an asset worth $125,000 to
her and yet worth only $100,000 on the market. We are all aware of
this risk of potential lost consumer's surplus; nevertheless, there are no
mechanisms available for her to pay someone else to bear the risk. She
would be unable to purchase insurance for her risk of loss of consumer's surplus. Possible suppliers of insurance would be reluctant to
insure an unmeasurable loss; and they would balk at the idea of creating a large incentive for her to practice arson on her own house. Even if
she had a legitimate desire for such insurance, others who might have
fewer scruples would be induced to purchase large insurance contracts
for alleged losses of consumer's surplus and then burn their houses intentionally. Social losses in the form of writing such insurance con14

There is, of course, no way for anyone to know this.
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tracts, setting the fires surreptitiously, attempting to detect the arson,
collecting evidence, punishing the arsonists, and generally deterring
such undesirable activities may well be greater than the dollar value of
the lost consumer's surplus. In fact it probably is greater or, according
to the 'everything is optimal' corollary of the Coase theorem, people
would have been willing to pay irisurance companies enough to entice
them to cover all of these additional costs and to offer such insurance
policies. Consequently, it is likely that house-owners are the least-cost
bearers of the risk of lost consumer's surplus.
Do these same problems apply for problems of compulsory acquisition? In a general sense they do, but the specifics are sufficiently different to merit explanation. Suppose that this same person from the previous example also faces a risk that her house will be taken from her via
a compulsory acquisition. As her house is worth $25,000 more to her
than it is on the market, she faces, then, a risk of losing this consumer's
surplus. Unlike the situation with a fire, she is unlikely to be able to
have much of an impact on the probabilities that such a loss might
occur; it would be much more difficult for her to surreptitiously cause a
compulsory acquisition of her house than to cause a fire. Hence moral
hazard would be unlikely to keep the private market from providing
her with insurance against this loss. Instead, the private market does
not provide such insurance because of the problem known as adverse
selection. This problem reduces the potential profitability of certain
types of insurance since primarily the bad risks are those who would
wish to purchase it. In the case of lost consumer's surplus as a result of
eminent domain, only those who are very likely to suffer from such a
loss, namely high risk house owners, would purchase such insurance,
especially if the premiums were the same for everyone. Similar premiums would be likely as risk-rating such insurance would be very costly
for private insurers. They would have to remain well informed of all
possible future exercises of eminent domain authority in order to do an
adequate job of risk rating. Consequently, insurers would be forced to
charge very high premiums to cover their payouts, so high in fact that
there would be too little of the insurance demanded to justify offering
it.
In a sense, then, Knetsch is correct in arguing that private markets
break down and are unable to offer insurance against the risk of lost
consumer's surplus. However it is important to keep in mind that they
break down relative to an idealized norm. It is not at all clear that
there is any feasible alternative to having house owners bear these risks
themselves. Suppose compensation through some government scheme
were offered to those people who lost consumer's surplus as a result of a
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compulsory acquisition. How would the appropriate amount to pay be
determined? Not only would the administrative costs of measurement
be very large, but there would also be a strong likelihood that the measures would create serious errors.
Even more seriously, any measurement scheme devised could create strong incentive effects which would alter the allocation of society's
resources. Using rejected offers as evidence of a lower bound of consumer's surplus has some merit at first blush, but the incentives for
prevarication which become readily apparent could create massive detection problems and costs for society. To continue our example, if evidence of the house owner's lost consumer's surplus were garnered from
the fact that she had recently rejected an offer of $125,000 for her
property, than others would have an incentive to bribe associates to
offer large amounts for their property too, with the understanding that
the offers would be rejected. Due to the potentially massive costs of
such a scheme, it should not be surprising that house owners are now
required to bear these risks themselves. When all costs are taken into
consideration, it is the house owners who are the least-cost bearers of
the risk of lost consumer's surplus.
Potential house owners, recognizing that they must bear such risks
themselves, will reduce the amount they are willing to pay for a house.
The amount of the reduction in their willingness to pay then, is a measure of the compensation they require to bear the risk themselves. In a
sense, this reduction can be viewed as ex ante compensation for their
risk bearing. Those potential purchasers who can bear such risks at the
lowest cost will demand the smallest reductions in purchase price and
will therefore be the most efficient owners of the property. To award
them compensation after the compulsory acquisition would therefore be
awarding them double compensation.15
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY
To this point, the efficiency aspects of compensation schemes have
been discussed to the exclusion of equity concerns. The two are not as
easily separated as I may have unintentionally implied by this false
dichotomy. It can easily be argued that in the end the two concerns are
inextricably entwined.
Equity concerns typically have two aspects, both of which are also
related to economic efficiency: (1) the first is a concern that people's
15 Of course, the market price would eventually adjust upward if everyone were certain to
receive compensation, and hence the amount of ex ante compensation would be reduced.
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reasonable expectations about the future not be thwarted; with this first
aspect, a policy is viewed as being unfair if it hurts people who had
good reason to expect something different; (2) the second is a concern
with redistributing society's wealth in a more nearly equal fashion.
The first aspect is congruent with long-run economic efficiency. If
people's reasonable expectations are not satisfied, long term investment
decisions will become more risky, more costly, and hence less likely.
Society will be worse off."' It is in this sense that Posner argues that
17
justice is equivalent to efficiency.
The second aspect of equity relates to economic efficiency in a different way. Programmes designed to redistribute society's wealth must
be based on some sort of criteria that determines who is to receive the
fruits of the scheme. These criteria, whatever they may be, create incentives for people to redirect their efforts and to reallocate society's
resources. Consequently, even though a policy may be proposed on the
basis of some desire to equalize wealth distribution, it will also have
efficiency effects which could, in some instances, be quite large.
Furthermore, arguments in favour of particular policies on distributional grounds have an interesting way of being misleading at best.
In the case of compensation for lost consumer's surplus due to eminent
domain, it is not that the wealthy would not benefit more than the poor.
If there is a positive relationship between a person's wealth and the
amount paid for a house, as seems plausible, then awarding compensation for lost consumer's surplus would indeed redistribute wealth, but to
the rich, rather than the poor. Perhaps this result provides an additional explanation as to why we do not award such compensation. More
generally, it is with some skepticism that one views such arguments
since they often represent carefully disguised pleadings for special interest groups.
It must be clear by now that there are theoretical problems with
the policy implications which Knetsch tries to draw from his work.
Nevertheless, his study is very exciting and provocative. It is extremely
unfortunate that the book itself is so expensive, because it would make
an excellent basis for much discussion by students of both economics
and law. The organization of the material and the presentation of the
legal and economic problems is superb. Every page stimulates one to
ponder issues which are at the frontiers of the disciplines. One hopes
16This notion of justice is consistent with economic efficiency explanations of the evolution of
the rule of stare decisis.
17 I have no desire to enter the fray. Interested readeis may wish to consult Posner, The
Economics of Justice (1982) and the references contained therein.
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that the fair-use exemptions or defences in copyright law will be exercised often for this book.

